Metanexus’s DAO Governance
The Metanexus Governance Model aims to create a decentralized, community-driven system that upholds the values of opportunity, transparency, and community-created governance. This model incorporates several key structures to empower MTX token holders and ensure fair representation in the decision-making process.
Council Vote Election
MTX holders can nominate individuals as council members. The council will consist of five individuals voted on by the community. Candidates must be nominated before the election date, and the voting period lasts 72 hours. All MTX members can vote or delegate their vote to a nominee. Proposed members from the Metanexus Discord channel will be prepared for holder voting through Snapshot.
Quadratic Voting
To prevent a plutocracy, quadratic voting protocols will be used to fairly weigh the votes and ensure that the largest stakeholders do not overshadow other members.
Metanexus Council
Elected by MTX holders, the Metanexus Council serves as a platform for community influence through representatives who can debate and instigate changes.
Metanexus Proposals
Two types of proposals can be submitted: Metanexus Configuration Change Proposals (MCCPs) and Metanexus Improvement Proposals (MIPs). MCCPs include the history and rationale for changing existing configurations, while MIPs propose improvements or changes to the system.
Council Epoch
Elected council members serve for a pre-configured duration, known as a Council Epoch. During this time, members are responsible for debating and voting on Configuration Change Proposals and Improvement Proposals in a public forum channel on Metanexus Discord.
Meta-Governance
Changes to the MTX council require unanimous decision-making.
Council Stipend
Council members receive payment at the end of a Council Epoch, with proportional compensation for those who do not serve the entire term or replace other members.
Supermajority
A supermajority is defined as ⌈(N+1) / 2⌉, where N represents the number of council members at the time of a vote. Supermajorities must be reached for each proposal.
Executioner DAO Discretion
In case of emergencies, the ExecutionerDAO can intervene as a backstop even if the council reaches a consensus.
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